

451. THE COURT (INCORPORATING CORUM OF DOYLE CJ, ANDERSON AND PEEK JJ) [194.], IN ITS CONSIDERATION, DETERMINATION AND JUDGMENT ([194.]), ARGUED (SEVERAL FALSE CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE OF CSA, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PAROLE BOARD, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), EXECUTIVE COUNCIL/CABINET, GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR-IN COUNCIL, PAROLE RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS OF LIFERS, RIGHTS OF 'APPLICANT' WATSON AS A PRISONER, AS A PRISONER APPLYING FOR PAROLE RELEASE, AS A PRISONER APPLYING FOR PAROLE AFTER PRIOR REFUSALS BY STATE GOVERNMENT, AND MORE), A 'SIGNIFICANTLY ERRONEOUS SCOPE OF JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY ASSOCIATED WITH GOVERNOR AND CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, AFTER BOARD 'FORWARDS ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL' ([100. AND
452. 101.])'. IN THE COURT'S REASONS [194.], IT DESCRIBES THE ARCHITECTURE BY AND FROM WHICH IT DRAWS APPRECIATION OF ITS DECISION, EXCEPT THAT IN THE COURT'S REASONING, IT IS OBVIOUS, NOT ONLY TO SEE WHY THE COURT'S DECISION WAS TECHNICALLY FLAWED (ERRONEOUS), BUT ALSO HOW MULTIPLE ERRORS RELATING TO 'JURISDICTIONAL APPRECIATION', COMPOUNDED THE COURT'S INDIVIDUAL FALSE BELIEFS INTO 'MISREPRESENTATION OF STATUTORY MANDATE', 'MISREPRESENTATION OF ACTUAL AUTHORITY AND COMPETENT JURISDICTION WITH SUBSTITUTED ERRORS OF FACT (IN STATUTE, PARLIAMENTARY INTENTION AND COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR AND GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), AGAINST THAT OF JUDICATURE (CH. III [3.]), AND ITS IMPOSED CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCE PURSUANT TO [45.])', RESULTING IN AN IMPROPER JUDGMENT DUE LARGELY TO FALSE/FLAWED CLAIMS
453. BY THE COURT. THE COURT WAS ACCURATE IN PARAGRAPH 112 [194. (PARA. 112)], WHERE IT CHARACTERISED THE WATSON APPEAL AS, FIRST, 'DETERMINE THE ACTUAL JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF [THE PAROLE BOARD], THE GOVERNOR (AS AN INDIVIDUAL), THE GOVERNOR [29.] BEING (FUNDAMENTALLY) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY' (CH. II [3.], [194. (PARA. 61.)]), THEN SECOND, 'DID THE ACTION OF THE GOVERNOR [29.] EXCEED THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE ([1.]), WITHIN WHICH ITS (GOVERNOR'S [29.]) JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY WAS DEFINED AND CONSTRAINED' (LIMITED)? IF SPECIFIC 'JURISDICTION' WAS EXCEEDED, AND AN ACT WAS DONE, AND SUCH ACT INJURED/DETRIMENTED WATSON, THEN THIRD, 'WHY AND WHERE WAS 'JURISDICTION' EXCEEDED, HOW TO REMEDY SUCH JURISDICTIONAL FRAUD, HOW TO EFFECT ONLY THAT WHICH WAS JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORISED (COMPETENT), SO AS TO ACHIEVE RESOLUTION TO THE

PURPOSE FOR WHICH GOVERNOR [29.] RECEIVED BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS (BEING, IN FACT, TO RECEIVE, PERFORM JUDICIAL BODY [33.] 'LEGAL SOUNDNESS' ASSESSMENT, THEN APPLY 'ROYAL SIGN-OFF' TO BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS)'. I AGREE WITH PARAGRAPH 112 CHARACTERISATION OF THE 'ISSUE' FUNDAMENTAL TO THE WATSON APPEAL. HOWEVER, THE ANCHOR TO THE COURT'S SERIOUS ERROR OF JUDGMENT, APPEARS TO HAVE GENESIS WITH THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF O'SHEA [205.], WHICH THE COURT REFLECTS ■ WITHIN ITS CHARACTERISED (ERRONEOUS) BELIEFS IN PARAGRAPH 103 [194. (PARA. 103.)]. I DO NOT AGREE WITH SUCH CHARACTERISATION, FOR THE FOLLOWING BRIEF REASONS (FROM PARAGRAPH 103.):

455. 1) "INVOLVES AN ATTACK ON THE EXERCISE OF A BROAD POWER." - IN WATSON, EVEN AFTER THE COURT ADMITTED THE KEY AND SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WATSON (LIFER WITH FIXED NPP APPLYING FOR PAROLE PURSUANT TO CSA, s. 67 [94.]), AND O'SHEA (SENTENCED TO "GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE" [204. (PARA. 83.)], WHERE 'ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE WAS VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR [29.] ONLY, NOT THE PAROLE BOARD OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY [33.] [204. (PARAS. 83, 84.)]), THE COURT ERRED BY APPLYING THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE GOVERNOR [29.] FROM AN O'SHEA ([205.]) TYPE SENTENCE, WHEREIN THE GOVERNOR [29.] HAD ABSOLUTE DISCRETION TO RELEASE PRISONER (O'SHEA), OR NOT, CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] EMPOWERED WITH NORDDED DISTINCTION "GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE", TO THE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE UPON WATSON WHICH, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING WATSON'S DESIGNATED AND IMPOSED NPP, MEANT THAT ONLY COURT HAD COMPETENCE TO DEFINE WATSON'S NPP, NOT GOVERNOR [29.] ([45.]), THEREFORE WAS NO 'GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE' PERMITTED TO BE APPLIED TO WATSON'S NPP, OR DETERMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASE (WHICH IN FACT WAS PURSUANT TO CSA, s. 66(1) [126.], EMPOWERED BY 456. [45., 72, AND (OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF) 78. AND 80.]). WATSON OWNED ACCRUED AND CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PROTECTED RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS UPON SENTENCING, AND AT NO TIME WAS WATSON EVER SENTENCED AT (OR TO), GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE, THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE AGAINST WATSON, AND ASSOCIATED AND ACCRUED RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS THEREAFTER OWNED BY WATSON, AND WHICH MUST BE ENFORCED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (UNDER CH. II [3.]), OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF [126., 127., 128., 45. AND 80.],

MUST BE ACTIONED TOWARDS WATSON SO AS TO SATISFY THE COURT'S SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON HIM.

457. 2.) "It is not a case in which the Governor was obliged to make particular findings of fact..." - This claim by the Court is not true. The Court has mistaken, through its failure to properly or competently investigate the Constitutional Competence (1.1) of the Governor [29.], within the Processing Phase of a Parole Release Application by Lifer (after Board has formally 'recommended' Parole Release [100. and 101.]), a long-held false (erroneous), belief by the Courts in South Australia, which is basically the same in operational effect as the false authority and false jurisdiction, which the South Australian Government illegally gives itself (via CH. II [3.]), about the actual jurisdictional competence and authority of Governor [29.], after receiving Board's recommendations [100. and 101.], and what Governor [29.] is constitutionally (1.1) permitted/empowered to do with said recommendations, what Governor [29.] is required to do with said recommendations, from where Governor [29.] acquires its claimed jurisdictional competence to perform/engage in acts which it performs/participates in (after receiving said recommendations). The Governor [29.], as described in more detail in above sections of this document, in addition to having a very narrow scope of jurisdictional authority/competence, with specific regard to the role and obligations of Governor [29.] after Governor receives Board's recommendations [100. and 101.], to Parole Release Lifer [see paragraph 362 *ibid*], being to only perform 'Judicial Body' [33.] Review (which incorporates a 'legal soundness' assessment and determination of Board's first recommendation (to release Lifer on Parole)), of Board's "recommendations", and in no way act outside such narrow jurisdiction such as by performing a political assessment, against respective Lifer applicant, to determine if approving Board's recommendation to Parole Release respective Lifer, will have a negative impact on 'that' political party (which is in Government, operating under CH. II [3.]), during next State Election, and if considered too detrimental
- 458.

459.

TO THE PARTY'S FUTURE IN GOVERNMENT, THEN TO 'REJECT BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS ([100.]), KNOWING THAT CONSEQUENTIAL TO REJECTING SAID BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS ([100.]), THE BOARD WOULD INVOKE CSA, SS. 67(9)(C), 67(10) [107., 108. AND 109.], AND IN REAL TERMS EQUATING TO AT LEAST ANOTHER 18 MONTHS MORE INCARCERATION TERM AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER APPLICANT'.

460.

PART 7. AND PART 8. OF THIS DOCUMENT PROVIDES GREATER DETAIL TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]) JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR AND GOVERNOR [29.], TO ASSIST WITH UNDERSTANDING EXACTLY 'WHY' THE COURT WAS WRONG, TO PURPORT AS 'AN ESTABLISHED FACT' (EVEN THOUGH THE COURT'S CLAIM WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), AND STATE LEGISLATIVELY (AS BETTER DESCRIBED IN OTHER SECTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT), FALSE/MISLEADING), THAT 'THIS WAS NOT A CASE IN WHICH GOVERNOR WAS OBLIGED TO MAKE PARTICULAR FINDINGS OF FACT'. IN FACT, AS DEFINED AND MANDATED IN STATUTE, INCLUDING CLCA [31.], CLSA [34.], CSA [123., 126., 127. AND 128.], CSA [86., 100. AND 101.], AND AIA [13.] AS BACKGROUND FOUNDATION FROM WHICH TO CLEARLY IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC AND COMPETENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR [29.], FOLLOWING [100.], WHICH ALSO DEFINES (ANCHORS), PARLIAMENT'S INTENTIONS REGARDING JURISDICTION OF BOARD DURING LIFER'S PAROLE REQUEST [94.], LIMIT AND SCOPE OF GOVERNOR [29.], ETC., THE GOVERNOR [29.], BY WAY OF 'JUDICIAL BODY REVIEW' ([33.]), IS REQUIRED AS A MATTER OF FACT (IN LAW), AND THEREFORE "OBLIGED TO MAKE PARTICULAR FINDINGS OF FACT", AS TO 'WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION (BEING BOARD'S FIRST RECOMMENDATION (TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE) [SEE PARAGRAPH 362 IBID]), IS 'LEGALLY SOUND'?', AND IF SO, THEN CONTINUE TO THE REMAINING BOARD

461.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAKE SAME ASSESSMENTS OF LEGAL SOUNDNESS. THIS ISSUE IS A FACT FINDING OBLIGATION IMPOSED UPON THE GOVERNOR (THOUGH TO THE DETRIMENT OF MANY LIFER APPLICANTS, SINCE 1-8-1994 [46.], STATE GOVERNMENT HAS ILLEGALLY REFUSED/NEGLECTED TO COMPETENTLY ACT WITHIN SUCH CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] CONSTRAINTS OF RESPECTIVE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND OBLIGATIONS), WHERE THE 'FACT' WHICH MUST BE PROPERLY DETERMINED BY GOVERNOR [29.], AND IS INTRINSIC ~~THE~~ ^{TO} THE 'APPROVAL' PROCESSES BY AND OF THE GOVERNOR [29.],

PURSUANT TO [100. AND 101.], AND CANNOT BE BYPASSED OR CIRCUMVENTED.

THEREFORE, 'THIS IS A CASE WHICH MUST, PER FUNDAMENTAL AND INTRINSIC OBLIGATION, INCLUDE A FACT BEING FOUND BY GOVERNOR [29.], SPECIFIC TO LEGAL SOUNDNESS OF BOARD'S FIRST RECOMMENDATION (TO RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE).

462. 3.) "HE WAS REQUIRED TO EXERCISE A BROADLY EXPRESSED POWER." - THIS CLAIM BY THE COURT IS NOT TRUE. THIS FALSE STATEMENT BY THE COURT IS SERIOUS IN THE EFFECTUAL CONSEQUENCE TO ITS APPLICATION, WITHIN THIS JUDGMENT, AND INCORPORATED DECISIONS AND DETERMINATIONS THEREIN ([194.]). IT IS OBVIOUS TO A COMPETENT OBSERVER THAT THIS COURT HAS APPLIED O'SHEA [205.], TO ITS VIEW THAT 'THE JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR [29.] WITHIN THE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS IS VERY BROAD'. HOWEVER, THE COURT WAS INCOMPETENT AND NEGLIGENT (IN ERROR), TO PERMIT AND THEN REINFORCE SUCH REASONING AND OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF O'SHEA [205.], WITHIN
463. WATSON'S APPEAL. THE JURISDICTIONAL LANDSCAPE BETWEEN O'SHEA APPEAL [205.], AND THIS WATSON APPEAL ([194.]), IS OF SUCH DISTINCTIVE DISHARMONY THAT THEY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED, APPRECIATED OR DETERMINED PROPERLY OR COMPETENTLY IF REGARDED ON PAR ([65.]), AND WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO JURISDICTIONAL ARENA OF GOVERNOR [29.] IN O'SHEA [205.], AND GOVERNOR [29.] IN WATSON (APPEAL), THERE
464. IS NO PARITY. IT WOULD BE SIMILAR TO CLAIMING THAT A 'BUSHBIKE' (WATSON, ACTUAL JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR), IS EQUAL TO THE 'SPACE SHUTTLE' (O'SHEA, ACTUAL JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR), IF THE COMPETENT OBSERVER AGREED WITH THIS COURT'S CLAIM (GOVERNOR HAVING A BROADLY EXPRESSED POWER), DUE TO 'BOTH VEHICLES BEING INVOLVED WITH TRANSPORTING PEOPLE' (WHEREAS, IN WATSON [194.], GOVERNOR'S [29.] ~~COMPETENT~~ COMPETENT JURISDICTION RE 'LIFER WITH FIXED NPP APPLYING FOR PAROLE RELEASE', AND O'SHEA (APPLICATION OF) [204. (PARAS. 83. AND 84.)], GOVERNOR'S [29.] COMPETENT JURISDICTION RE 'LIFER SERVING TIME 'AT GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE''), EXCEPT THAT, IN FACT, IT IS REALLY ONLY ACCURATE TO SHOW THAT BOTH PRISONERS (WATSON, O'SHEA), WERE APPLYING FOR PAROLE, OR SIMILAR OBJECT TO PAROLE, BUT TECHNICALLY NOT PAROLE RELEASE, WHICH IN THE CASE OF O'SHEA WAS MORE LIKE 'RELEASE ON "LICENCE"', WHEREBY ABSOLUTE DISCRETION TO RELEASE O'SHEA WAS VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR [29.], BUT FOR WATSON AND

ALL OTHER LIFERS APPLYING FOR 'RELEASE ON PAROLE', THE JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO RELEASE (APPROVE PAROLE RELEASE), SUCH LIFERS WAS VESTED IN THE PAROLE BOARD ALONE, AFTER 1-8-1994 [46.], AND THE GOVERNOR [29.] (AFTER 'JUDICIAL BODY REVIEW' [33.] AND ASSESSMENT OF 'LEGAL SOUNDNESS' OF BOARD'S FIRST RECOMMENDATION, WHICH WAS TO RECOMMEND RELEASE OF LIFER ON PAROLE), WAS THE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE BOARD'S CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] COMPETENT DECISION TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE, BY WAY OF SIGN-OFF (SIGNATURE OF GOVERNOR), TO SHOW AND EFFECT ROYAL CONSENT TO BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS (IN A SIMILAR WAY TO THE GOVERNOR (IN PERSON), PRESENTING THE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE DECISION OF CABINET, DESCRIBED RESPECTIVELY IN WATSON [194. (PARA. 61.)]).

465. THEREFORE, TO EMPOWER THE GOVERNOR [29.], IN ITS RECEIPT OF BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS (CSA. SS. 67(6), 67(7) [100. AND 101.], 'WHO WAS IN FACT, LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] AND STATUTORY COMPETENCE, THEREBY SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTED AND LIMITED JURISDICTIONALLY, ON BEHALF OF THE QUEEN (ROYAL ORDER), TO INVESTIGATE AND DETERMINE THE 'LEGAL SOUNDNESS' OF THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS ONLY, SO THAT THE GOVERNOR [29.] 'COULD THEN "APPROVE" BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS (WITH ROYAL CONSENT ([29.]])' [PART. 6, 7. AND 8. DESCRIBE IN GREATER DETAIL, ACTUAL JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR, COMPARED TO THE FALSE JURISDICTION THE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), HAS ILLEGALLY EFFECTED INTO GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS],

466. WITH FALSE JURISDICTION ([64. AND 82. AND 83.]), WHEREBY SAID 'FALSE JURISDICTION AND FALSE AUTHORITY' ARE ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AND BY THE COURT IN THE WATSON APPEAL [194.], IN SUCH

467. AN INCOMPETENT AND NEGLIGENT MANNER, SO AS TO NOT ONLY ENABLE ~~WATSON IN~~ THE PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR, CABINET AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT (DURING THE PROCESSING PHASE OF WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION TO THE PAROLE BOARD [94.]), TO IMPROPERLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] DENY WATSON STATUTORY AND PARLIAMENTARY INTENTIONS AND 'RIGHTS' ATTACHED TO HIS PAROLE APPLICATION ([94.]), WHICH, IF OBSERVED ([65.]), WOULD NOT HAVE STOLEN WATSON'S OPERATIONAL PROTECTIONS FROM HIM (BY JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT ACTS BY STATE GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS), WHICH WERE CLEARLY (AND FREE

468. OF AMBIGUITY), DESCRIBED IN HANSARD AND STATUTE, YET STILL DENIED TO HIM AND
 IN EFFECT STOLEN FROM HIM BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WHERE SUCH 'RIGHTS'
 INCLUDED THE 'JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE BOARD (WHO RECOMMENDED
 WATSON BE PAROLE RELEASED [100.]), THE VERY LIMITED/NARROW AND CLEARLY
 DEFINED CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]) JURISDICTION PERMITTED TO GOVERNOR [29.], WHO
 RECEIVED BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS (PURSUANT TO CSA, SS. 67(6), 67(7) [100. AND
 101.]), REQUIRING 'ONLY A LEGAL SOUNDNESS DETERMINATION OF SAME BOARD
 RECOMMENDATIONS', AND THEN "APPROVING" SAME RECOMMENDATIONS (CSA, S.
 67(6)(B) ("GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL") [100.]), TO BE OPERATIONALLY REPRESENTED BY
 A LAWYER DURING "ANY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE BOARD" (CSA, S. 77(3) [113.]), TO
 WHICH WATSON IS A PARTICIPANT IN SOME ASPECT (SUCH AS PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS),
 469. WHICH RESULTED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED DECISION BY THE STATE
 GOVERNMENT (GOVERNOR [29.] REFUSING PAROLE RELEASE AFTER ~~BOARD~~ BOARD
 RECOMMENDED PAROLE RELEASE [100.]), AS GOVERNOR [29.] HAD NO COMPETENT
 JURISDICTION TO CREATE SAID DECISION [82. AND 83.], AND NOT JUST
 'ENABLE' THE ILLEGALLY CREATED DECISION BY GOVERNOR [29.] (WHICH WAS TO
 470. REFUSE PAROLE APPLICATION OUTRIGHT), BUT ALSO TO PERPETUATE AND PROTECT
 SAID ILLEGALLY CREATED DECISION BY GOVERNOR [29.] (IN SIMPLE TERMS, IT WAS
 A 'FINAL' DECISION CREATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (IN CABINET,
 WHILST EFFECTING OPERATIONAL STATUS ACHIEVED UNDER OPERATION OF CH. II [3.]
 AUTHORITY, AND SO EFFECTED IN SUCH A MANNER EQUATING TO 'CRIMINAL ABUSE
 OF JURISDICTION' AND 'CRIMINAL ABUSE OF AUTHORITY'), IN AN ARENA (CABINET
 HEARINGS), WHICH RESPECTIVE LIFER (WATSON, OR HIS REPRESENTING LAWYER
 CSA, S. 77(3) [113.]), WERE NEVER GOING TO BE PERMITTED ACCESS TO OR BE
 471. PROPERLY HEARD BY OR WITHIN (CABINET CONFIDENTIALITY)), BY CLAIMING AS AN
OPERATIONAL FACT (EVEN THOUGH CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]) PROHIBITED, AS CLEAR
 STATUTORY (AIA AND CSA AND CLSA [13, 86, 34]), INTENTIONS AND
 MANDATORY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS/PROCEDURES WERE DESCRIBED IN SUCH
 UNAMBIGUOUS WORDING ([64.]), AND ^{IN} 'POSITIVE AND LINEAR FORM' ([64.]),
 SO AS TO SHOW CLEAR PASSAGE OF ACTION PER WHATEVER DECISION WAS MADE

- BY THE PAROLE BOARD REGARDING A LIFER'S APPLICATION FOR PAROLE RELEASE, TO RECOMMEND RELEASE (CSA. s. 67(6) [100.], WHICH THEN INCORPORATES [101.], AND THEN (PER ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] COMPLIANT ACTION), MUST ONLY CONCLUDE WITH APPLICANT BEING INFORMED BY THE BOARD ["4.TH FEATURE" OF THE PROCESSING PHASE, SEE PARAGRAPH 362. IBID], IN WRITING, LIFER'S DESIGNATED DATE OF RELEASE, DESIGNATED CONDITIONS, AND DURATION OF PAROLE), OR TO REFUSE TO RELEASE ON PAROLE/RECOMMENDATION (TO RELEASE) IS NOT AWARDED (CSA. s. 67(9) [107.]), THAT GOVERNOR [29.] HAD JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY TO VOID BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION (TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE), AND TO SUBSTITUTE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION (TO RELEASE ON PAROLE), WITH GOVERNOR'S OWN DECISION (FORMED WITHIN CABINET [29.]), CONTRADICTING BOARD'S FORMAL DECISION [100.] WITH REFUSAL TO RELEASE (LIFER ON PAROLE)', AND SAID FALSE (ILLEGAL) JURISDICTION ([64. AND 82. AND 83.]), WAS SOURCED FROM O'SHEA [205.], AND SUCH 'ABSOLUTE DISCRETION OF GOVERNOR [29.]' IN AN O'SHEA CIRCUMSTANCE SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN APPLIED (WITH ANY AUTHORITY), IN A WATSON TYPE OF PAROLE APPLICATION (THE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS/LANDSCAPE ATTACHED TO O'SHEA, AND THAT ATTACHED TO WATSON ARE JURISDICTIONALLY VERY DIFFERENT, AND DUE TO VERY DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS OF BOARD AND OF GOVERNOR [29.], IN BOTH RESPECTIVE TYPES OF ^{PAROLE APPLICATION} ~~PAROLE~~ PROCESS, IT IS ERRONEOUS TO PLACE BOTH UNDER THE O'SHEA BANNER). IN O'SHEA [205.], THE PAROLE APPLICATION LANDSCAPE OF JURISDICTION FOR 'A PRISONER SERVING "AT GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE"', WAS DETERMINED BY THE HIGH COURT TO BE AT THE ABSOLUTE DISCRETION OF THE GOVERNOR ([29.]), TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THERE WAS NO LIMIT ON THE 'JURISDICTION OF THE GOVERNOR', OR THE 'AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR', AND THEREFORE, AND THEREBY, CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] COMPETENT TO REFUSE WHOLE APPLICATION BY O'SHEA (TO BE RELEASED FROM CUSTODY), NOT JUST THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS' BUT THE ENTIRE APPLICATION, BY A PRISONER SERVING AT GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE (EVEN THE REFERENCE TERM IDENTIFIED SPECIFIC AUTHORITY... "AT GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE") [WATSON, # 204. (PARAS. 83, 84), 206. (85, 87.)]. IN WATSON [194., 204. AND 206.], THE PAROLE

- APPLICATION LANDSCAPE OF JURISDICTION FOR 'A PRISONER SERVING A LIFE SENTENCE',
 WAS (SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT TO THAT OF O'SHEA [205.], AND PRISONERS LIKE
 O'SHEA, WHO WERE SENTENCED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, AS THEIR
 RESPECTIVE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THEM, TO "GOVERNOR'S
 PLEASURE", AND INTRINSIC TO SUCH SENTENCE, WAS THE FOUNDATION FOR SUCH
 SENTENCE, WHICH IN THE CASE OF O'SHEA [205.] (WAS DETERMINED BY THE
 476. SENTENCING COURT TO BE), "UNABLE TO CONTROL THEIR SEXUAL INSTINCTS"
 [206. (PARA. 86.)]), WAS FUNDAMENTALLY, INCLUDING CLEAR, POSITIVE, AFFIRMATIVE
 AND UNAMBIGUOUS WORDING IN CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] AND STATUTORY (AND CRIMINAL
 LAW JUDGMENTS) [64.] PROCEDURE (AS REQUIRED DUE PROCESS PRACTICAL ACTIONS),
 WHICH, IF EFFECTED COMPETENTLY, WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN WATSON RECEIVING
 OPERATIONAL BENEFIT OF THE SENTENCING STANDARDS WHICH APPLIED AT THE TIME
 HIS CRIME HAPPENED ([69., 72., 77., 80., 45., 139., 196., 197., 194. (PARA. 31.), 124.,
 477. 126. AND 84.]), HOWEVER, AS ALREADY DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT,
WATSON DID NOT HAVE HIS PROPER AND COMPETENT SENTENCE (~~HE~~ IMPOSED BY THE
 SENTENCING COURT), ENFORCED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT, INSTEAD MR
 WATSON WAS ILLEGALLY RESENTENCED BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT,
 SEVERAL TIMES, AND WATSON'S ACCRUED RIGHTS UPON COURT SENTENCING [194. (PARA.
 31.)], BEING IN PARTICULAR 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' [126.], AND 'REMISSIONS' [52.,
 137. AND 139.], WERE STOLEN FROM WATSON BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT
 (AS DESCRIBED IN GREATER DETAIL IN OTHER SECTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT), IN A
 MANNER WHICH ~~THE~~ SHOWS STATE GOVERNMENT ACQUIRING FALSE AUTHORITY,
 THEN USING THE FALSE AUTHORITY TO ILLEGALLY RESENTENCE, AND ILLEGALLY
 RETAIN IN CUSTODY, AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMING THEIR
 CONDUCT IS LAWFULLY ACQUIRED (CONSISTENT WITH O'SHEA [205.] REASONING),
 JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, WHICH IN FACT IT IS NOT.. [131. AND 196.]
478. THE COURT HAS MADE SO MANY ERRORS IN THIS JUDGMENT, DUE TO FALSE BELIEFS (OF THE
 COURT), MISREPRESENTATION (OF COMPETENT STATUTORY JURISDICTION OF SPECIFIC PARTIES,
 PRIMARILY PAROLE BOARD AND GOVERNOR [SEE PART. 6, PART. 7. AND PART. 8. IBID]), AND
 LACK OF APPRECIATION (OF LINEAR PROCESSES ASSIGNED TO SPECIFIC ACTIONS/EVENTS AFTER

PAROLE APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY WATSON (OR ANY LIFER APPLICANT)), THAT TECHNICAL CHALLENGE SHOULD BE PERMITTED, AND ACTIONED, AGAINST THE FORMAL JUDGMENT OF THE COURT, DUE TO THE 'REASONING' OF THE COURT BEING FLAWED/ERRONEOUS, WHEREBY THE 'JUDGMENT PROPER', WHICH WAS TO 'DISMISS' WATSON'S CHALLENGE (VIA JUDICIAL REVIEW), DUE TO LACK OF MERIT/COMPETENCE IN WATSON'S COMPLAINT AGAINST GOVERNOR, THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (BEING THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT),

479. WAS THE CULMINATION OF SEVERAL 'DECISIONS/DETERMINATIONS' ^{WITHIN} ~~THE~~ THE COURT'S HEARING (JUDICIAL REVIEW), WHICH THEMSELVES WERE FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED/ERRONEOUS (IN THEIR OUTCOME, WHICH WAS 'THE ARRIVED AT DECISION AND THE MAKING OF SAME'), AND THE COMBINED FORCE OF ALL SUCH 'DECISIONS/DETERMINATIONS', HAVING INTRINSIC BEARING ON FORMAL JUDGMENT, MEANT THAT JUDGMENT PROPER ('OUTCOME'), WAS DETERMINED BY

480. THE COURT, AND THEREFORE ACHIEVED, AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE TO THE COURT MISDIRECTING ITSELF AND MISINFORMING ITSELF, ABOUT FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT, OF PARTICULAR QUALIFICATION (BEING SOUGHT), WAS 'THE JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD AND AUTHORITY WITHIN SUCH JURISDICTION', 'THE JURISDICTION OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE AUTHORITY WITHIN SUCH JURISDICTION', 'WEIGHT OF DECISION BY THE BOARD [100.] COMPARED TO JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR', 'WERE THERE ANY CONSTRAINTS OF GOVERNOR FOLLOWING [100. AND 101.], AND IF SO THEN WHAT WERE THEY, THEN, IF ANY, WERE ANY CONSTRAINTS BREACHED, AND IF SO, THEN, WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME OF ALLEGED CONSTRAINT ~~BREACH~~ BREACH, AND, DID ANY SUCH CONSTRAINT BREACH CONSEQUENTIALLY VIOLATE ANY RIGHT/ENTITLEMENT OF THE LIFER APPLICANT', 'WHAT WERE THE RIGHTS AND/OR ENTITLEMENTS OF THE LIFER APPLICANT DURING ENTIRE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS (SUBMISSION [94.] UNTIL FORMAL NOTIFICATION BY THE BOARD, BEING EITHER RELEASE DETAILS OR REFUSAL BY BOARD [107.]), AND WERE 'THEY' ALL OBSERVED PROPERLY', 'WHAT WERE THE OBLIGATIONS, LIMITATIONS, MANDATORY OPERATIONAL ACTS (REQUIRED TO BE EFFECTED AND ENFORCED), OF AND BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND ITS INSTRUMENTALITIES [33. AND 1. (CH. II), 3. (CH. II).], AND WERE 'THEY' ALL PROPERLY OBSERVED'. [64., 65., 82. AND 83.]

481. DUE TO THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF ERRORS IN THE WATSON MATTER, IT IS EASIER TO HIGHLIGHT SOME KEY PARAGRAPHS FROM THE WATSON JUDGMENT [194.], IN PARAGRAPH ORDER (MAKING FOR EASIER READING), AND READ WITH CONSIDERATION TO OTHER SECTIONS OF

487. WAS ONLY A 'SIGN-OFF' TO BOARD'S 'RECOMMENDATIONS', WHICH IS ACTUALLY QUALIFIED BY 'POSITIVE AND AFFIRMATIVE WORDING IN STATUTE' ([64.]), CSA.
488. S. 67(6) [100.] AT '67(6)' "IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS" (BEING, IF IT RECOMMENDS PAROLE RELEASE, THEN), AT '67(6)(A)' "MUST RECOMMEND TO GOVERNOR" (WHICH CLEARLY DEFINES A VERY NARROW SCOPE OF JURISDICTION AND EXACTLY WHAT MUST BE RECOMMENDED, AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ^{IT} ALSO TREATS "IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS" AS BEING CLEARLY WORDED BY PARLIAMENT, AS OUTSIDE SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR TO CHALLENGE, OTHER THAN A LEGAL SOUNDNESS REVIEW ([33.])), THEREFORE, PARLIAMENT HAS INTENDED AND TREATED '67(6)' "IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS" AS ONE OF TWO 'ABSOLUTES' (ONE IS CSA. S. 67(6) "IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS", THE SECOND BEING CSA. S. 67(9) "THE BOARD MUST... AFTER REFUSING AN APPLICATION" [100. AND 107.]), THEREBY ALSO HOLDING CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]) JURISDICTION, AND AS SOLE ENTITY WITH VESTED COMPETENCE (INCLUDING ABOVE GOVERNOR [29.]), AND ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY, TO DETERMINE 'IF' PAROLE RELEASE WAS TO BE EFFECTED OR NOT, AND SO, 'IF' BOARD RECOMMENDS, THEN GOVERNOR MUST ACCEPT AND 'APPROVE' (BY WAY OF FORMAL SIGNATURE), BOARD'S DECISION, BUT ONLY AFTER GOVERNOR [29.] HAS PERFORMED A JUDICIAL BODY [33.] REVIEW OF THE 'LEGAL SOUNDNESS' OF DECISION BY BOARD TO PAROLE RELEASE LIFER, THEN, AFTER SAID 'LEGAL SOUNDNESS REVIEW' (WHICH, IF DETERMINED TO BE, IN FACT AND LAW TO BE A 'LEGALLY SOUND DECISION BY BOARD TO RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE'),
489. THE JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE (WHICH IS STILL VERY NARROW), RETURNS TO THE FINAL TWO (OF THREE [SEE PARAGRAPH 362. IBID]), RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE BOARD (CSA. SS. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii) [100.]), AND THESE TWO RECOMMENDATIONS ARE THE ('DISCRETIONARY' BECAUSE, IF GOVERNOR [29.] REFUSES TO APPROVE THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDED 'DAY OF RELEASE' CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i) AND/OR 'LENGTH OF PAROLE' CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(ii), THEN GOVERNOR MUST REUNITE THE BOARD WITH ITS DISCRETIONARY REQUIREMENT ASSOCIATED WITH SAID CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i) AND/OR 67(6)(A)(ii), UNTIL BOARD DETERMINES DIFFERENT 'DAY OF' AND/OR 'LENGTH OF' PAROLE RELEASE), ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE BOARD WHICH GOVERNOR [29.]

491. HAS ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO ADJUST, VARY, DECLINE TO APPROVE (WHICH THEREFORE RESTRICTS EXACTLY WHAT GOVERNOR IS PERMITTED TO DO WITH WHAT IT RECEIVES FROM BOARD (AFTER CSA. S. 67(6) [100.]), AND EXACTLY WHAT GOVERNOR IS AUTHORISED TO DO WITH SAME, WITHIN THE REAL OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF CSA. S. 67(7) [101.], AND EXACTLY WHAT GOVERNOR MUST DO WITH SAME (WHICH IS, IT (GOVERNOR [29.]) MUST "APPROVE" BOTH 'DISCRETIONARY RECOMMENDATION' ELEMENTS INCORPORATED WITHIN CSA. S. 67(6), NOTING THAT, AT THE ARRIVAL OF "IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS" (CSA. S. 67(6)), IT IS THEREAFTER AN ABSOLUTE EVENT (SUBSEQUENT TO A LEGAL SOUNDNESS REVIEW BY GOVERNOR [29.]), THAT PAROLE RELEASE WILL BE RECEIVED BY LIFER BECAUSE THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S SOLE COMPETENT AUTHORITY (PAROLE BOARD), TO MAKE SUCH DECISION, ON BEHALF OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT, IN FACT HAS DETERMINED SO, AND THEREFORE THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (UNDER CH. II AUTHORITY [3.]), MUST ABIDE BY AND ENFORCE SAID DETERMINATION/DECISION TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE, WHICH THEN ONLY LEAVES (AND IN FACT, ONLY PERMITS WITHIN A VERY RESTRICTED AND NARROW SCOPE OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE), THE 'DISCRETIONARY ELEMENTS' INTRINSIC TO THE (BOARD'S) DECISION (FORMAL RECOMMENDATION, CSA. S. 67(6)), WHICH IS TO RELEASE LIFER ON PAROLE', AND SUCH 'INTRINSIC DISCRETIONARY ELEMENTS' ARE
492. CLEARLY AND POSITIVELY WORDED IN STATUTE [64.], AS FORMAL INTENTIONS OF PARLIAMENT, IN STATUTORY WORDING, AS 'DAY OF RELEASE' CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i), AND 'PERIOD OF RELEASE' CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(ii) ([100.])], BUT, EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNOR [29.] "MAY" (AIA. S. 34. [30.], THE WORD "MAY" IMPARTS "DISCRETION" [30.]), CHOOSE TO ACCEPT THE BOARD'S SPECIFIED DATE OF PAROLE RELEASE, AND LENGTH OF PAROLE RELEASE, "SPECIFIED IN THE ORDER" (CSA. S. 67(7) [101.]), WHERE "THE ORDER" ~~████~~ [101.] IN FACT IS ONLY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i) AND ~~████~~ CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(ii), THE
493. GOVERNOR [29.] HAS JURISDICTION TO INVOKE "MAY" [30.], AND CHOOSE TO DECLINE THE BOARD'S SPECIFIED 'DATE' (CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i)), AND/OR 'LENGTH' (CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(ii)), UNTIL THE GOVERNOR [29.] IS SATISFIED WITH
- 494.
- 495.
- 496.

497. A SPECIFIED 'DATE' AND/OR 'LENGTH' OF PAROLE RELEASE, WHICH GOVERNOR [29.] MUST THEN 'APPROVE' BY WAY OF FORMAL, WRITTEN APPROVAL. GOVERNOR [29.] HAS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY TO 'REFUSE OUTRIGHT' THE BOARD'S 'TWO DISCRETIONARY ELEMENTS' ((CSA. SS. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii)), AS IT MUST AS A MANDATORY IMPOSITION UPON THE GOVERNOR [29.], INTRINSIC TO THE GOVERNOR [29.] HAVING FORWARDED "TO GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL" CSA. S. 67(6)(B) [100.], AND INTRINSIC TO GOVERNOR RECEIVING SAME (CSA. S. 67(7) [101.]), AND IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT, IN ORDER FOR GOVERNOR [29.] TO EVEN START CONSIDERING 'ORDERS FROM THE BOARD AS TO SPECIFIED DATE OF PAROLE RELEASE AND
498. SPECIFIED LENGTH OF PAROLE RELEASE', THE GOVERNOR [29.] MUST HAVE ~~THE~~ ALREADY PERFORMED AND CONCLUDED ITS JUDICIAL BODY [33.] REVIEW OF BOARD'S FORMAL DECISION (TO 'RELEASE LIFER' ON PAROLE), TO DETERMINE LEGAL SOUNDNESS OF 'BOARD'S FORMAL DECISION', AND ONLY IF DETERMINED AS 'LEGALLY SOUND' MUST THE GOVERNOR [29.] THEN MOVE ON TO ITS NEXT OBLIGATION, WHICH IS TO CONSIDER, THEN, EVENTUALLY, 'APPROVE' (CSA. S. 67(6) "IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS", CSA. S. 67(6)(A) "[THEN ALSO] MUST RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNOR", CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i) "A DAY...; AND", CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(ii) "A PERIOD OF", [100.]), A DATE AND PERIOD OF PAROLE RELEASE, 'BUT AT NO TIME WITHIN OPERATION OF CSA. S. 67(7) [101.], IS THERE ANY JURISDICTION COMPETENT TO THE ACTION OR EFFECT OF GOVERNOR [29.], WHICH IN ANY WAY PERMITS GOVERNOR [29.] TO 'REFUSE' OR 'DECLINE' PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, BECAUSE THAT IS OUTSIDE THE VERY NARROW SCOPE OF JURISDICTIONAL
499. AUTHORITY ASSIGNED TO GOVERNOR [29.], BY 'COLLABORATIVE OPERATIONAL' EFFECT OF BOTH CSA. S. 67(6) (PAROLE BOARD, AFTER DECISION TO PAROLE RELEASE (BECAUSE IF BOARD DOES NOT DECIDE TO PAROLE RELEASE, THEN ONLY OTHER DECISION WHICH STATE GOVERNMENT'S SOLE COMPETENT REPRESENTATIVE (THE PAROLE BOARD), IS PERMITTED TO ASSOCIATIVELY MAKE IS TO REFUSE TO PAROLE RELEASE CSA. S. 67(9) [107.]), WHICH INTRINSICALLY INCORPORATES TWO
500. DISCRETIONARY ELEMENTS (VARIABLE COMPONENTS), BEING CSA. SS. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii), AND ALL THREE BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS [SEE PARAGRAPHS
- 501.

362. AND 401. IBID], THEN GET FORWARDED ("TO THE GOVERNOR" CSA. s. 67(6)(B)),
502. TO THE SECOND PARTY TO THE 'COLLABORATIVE OPERATION', THE GOVERNOR [29.] "FOR APPROVAL" (CSA. s. 67(6)(B) [100.], AND THE ACT OF "APPROVAL" IS BROKEN DOWN TO THREE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS, FIRST BEING 'RECOMMENDATION TO RELEASE ON PAROLE', REQUIRING 'LEGAL SOUNDNESS' REVIEW BY GOVERNOR [29.] SITTING AS A JUDICIAL BODY [33.], THEN, IF LEGALLY SOUND, MOVE TO SECOND
503. AND THIRD SPECIFIC ELEMENTS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE 'DISCRETIONATE VARIABLE COMPONENTS', WHICH GOVERNOR MAY ACCEPT/APPROVE OR DECLINE, BUT ULTIMATELY MUST EVENTUALLY CONCLUDE WITH GOVERNOR'S FORMAL APPROVAL, WITH SIGNATURE, AS THAT IS THE OBLIGATION IMPOSED UPON GOVERNOR BETWEEN
504. OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF BOTH CSA. s. 67(6) AND CSA. s. 67(7)), AND SAID SECOND PARTY PURSUANT TO CSA. s. 67(7) (GOVERNOR [29.]), WHICH MUST ONLY "APPROVE", ULTIMATELY, AND AS A REQUIRED CONDITION UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNOR [29.] RECEIVES FROM BOARD ([100.]), THAT IS, THE CONCLUSION OF GOVERNOR'S [29.] OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT UNDER CONSTRAINTS OF CSA. s. 67(7) [101.], THE GOVERNOR MUST FORWARD ITS FORMALISATION OF ROYAL APPROVAL OF BOARD'S SAID RECOMMENDATIONS ([100.]), TO BOARD WITH GOVERNOR'S OFFICIAL SIGNING-OFF (SIGNATURE), THEREIN 'APPROVING BOARD'S SAID RECOMMENDATIONS, AFTER WHICH THE GOVERNOR'S [29.] OBLIGATION TO SUCH
505. MATTERS (UNDER [101.]), IS CONCLUDED. OF FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE, IS THAT SUBSECTION 'B' OF CSA. s. 67(6)(B), RESTRICTS EXACTLY WHAT IS SENT TO GOVERNOR FOR GOVERNOR TO RECEIVE, CONSIDER, THEN APPROVE, WHICH, AS CLEARLY DEFINED IN WORDS BY PARLIAMENT [64.], THE OPERATION
506. OF CSA. s. 67(6)(B) IS ONLY AGAINST CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii), AND, THIS ITSELF IS QUALIFIED BY ITS DESIGNATION AS A SUBSECTION TO 67(6), WHEREBY, WHEN FOLLOWING THE PASSAGE OF AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION WITHIN CSA. s. 67(6), STARTING AT "THE BOARD MAY" ... "RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNOR" (THERE IS A DISCRETIONARY CHARACTERISTIC ATTACHED BECAUSE AT THAT POINT, THE (DISCRETIONARY) OPTIONS AVAILABLE ARE CSA. s. 67(9) (REFUSE TO RELEASE ON PAROLE, APPLICATION BY PRISONER THEREFORE REJECTED), AND

- CSA. s. 67(6) ("IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS, THE BOARD [MUST]"), AND THE USE OF "MAY" IMPARTS DISCRETION [30.], HOWEVER, ONCE YOU REACH "AND, IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS", THEN YOU MOVE AWAY FROM DISCRETION
507. AND STRICT OBLIGATIONS ARE IMPOSED ON BOARD (IN REAL TERMS, PAROLE IS RECOMMENDED AND THEREFORE MUST BE RECEIVED BY LIFER APPLICANT, WITH MANDATORY COMPONENTS THEN TO BE DETERMINED, WHICH ARE THE VARIABLE ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED AS 'DAY OF' AND 'LENGTH OF' PAROLE RELEASE), FOUND
508. AT OBLIGATION ONE CSA. s. 67(6)(A) "MUST RECOMMEND TO GOVERNOR" (THIS POINT IS THE FRONT-END OF WHAT MUST GO TO GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL, AND THE BACK-END IS WHAT MUST GO TO GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL, FOUND IN CSA. s. 67(6)(B) AND IDENTIFIED AS "ITS RECOMMENDATIONS"), AND THEN
509. AT OBLIGATION TWO CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii), AND ONCE OBLIGATIONS
510. ONE AND TWO ARE COMPLETED, THEN PROGRESS TO OBLIGATION THREE WHICH DEFINES WHAT BOARD MUST DO WITH OBLIGATION TWO, WHICH IS CSA. s. 67(6)(B) "MUST FORWARD A COPY OF ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR" (WHERE SAID ^{RECOMMENDATIONS} ~~CONFERENCES~~ ARE ONLY CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND WHY MUST BOARD FORWARD TO GOVERNOR, "FOR APPROVAL" (CSA. s. 67(6)(B)), AND THEN PROGRESS THAT 'VERY NARROW SCOPE ^{OF} JURISDICTION AND OBLIGATIONS' TO THE NEXT POINT, BEING CSA. s. 67(7) (GOVERNOR'S RECEIPT OF OBLIGATION TWO ('~~FOR~~ RECOMMENDATIONS' CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND WHAT MUST BE THE CONCLUSION TO GOVERNOR'S RECEIPT [101.] OF OBLIGATION TWO (DEFINED AT CSA. s. 67(6)(B)), "MUST FORWARD... FOR APPROVAL."), AND NOTE THAT AT THIS POINT IN THE 'COLLABORATIVE OPERATION'
511. BETWEEN CSA. s. 67(6) AND CSA. s. 67(7), STRICT OBLIGATIONS ARE IMPOSED ON GOVERNOR [29.] (IN REAL TERMS, PAROLE RELEASE MUST BE RECEIVED BY LIFER APPLICANT (AFTER 'LEGAL SOUNDNESS' REVIEW DETERMINES BOARD'S 'RELEASE
512. RECOMMENDATION' IS 'LEGALLY SOUND'), THEREFORE THE 'DISCRETIONATE VARIABLE COMPONENTS' MUST OPERATE WITHIN THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION TO THE STRICT OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON GOVERNOR [29.], WHICH ARE IMPOSED BY PARLIAMENT IN CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS WORDING ([64.]), AT CSA. s. 67(6)(B) "FOR APPROVAL"),

513.

WHO IS THE SECOND PARTY TO THE 'COLLABORATIVE OPERATION' (BETWEEN [100.] AND [101.]), BEING, ⁶OBLIGATION FOUR WHICH REQUIRES GOVERNOR 'TO RECEIVE' OBLIGATION TWO, AT CSA. S. 67(6)(B) "MUST FORWARD ... RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR", RECEIVING AT CSA. S. 67(7) "THE GOVERNOR ... ON RECEIVING", AND WHAT GOVERNOR MUST RECEIVE, WHICH IS AT CSA. S. 67(7) "THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS" (WHERE SAID 'RECOMMENDATIONS' (WHICH ARE 'DISCRETIONATE VARIABLE COMPONENTS'), ARE OBLIGATION TWO CSA. SS. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND WHAT GOVERNOR MUST DO WITH UPON

514.

RECEIVING "THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS" (CSA. S. 67(7)), BEING, ⁶OBLIGATION FIVE WHICH IS TO CONSIDER, THEN, ULTIMATELY, IN CONCLUSION TO THE OPERATION OF CSA. S. 67(7), 'MUST APPROVE', AND WHAT MUST GOVERNOR APPROVE... "THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS" (CSA. S. 67(7)), AND HOW DO WE KNOW THIS... "MUST FORWARD ... RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL."

515.

(CSA. S. 67(6)(B)), AND WHAT ARE THE RECOMMENDATIONS... "A DAY ON" AND "A PERIOD OF" (CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i) AND CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE PERMITTED TO BE DONE BY GOVERNOR WITHIN OPERATION OF CSA. S. 67(7) OTHER THAN ULTIMATELY 'APPROVE' BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS... NO... AND HOW DO WE KNOW THIS... TWO DISTINCT IDENTIFIERS, ⁶FIRST, AT CSA. S. 67(6)(B) "MUST FORWARD ... FOR APPROVAL.", AND ⁶SECOND, AT CSA. S. 67(7) "THE GOVERNOR "MAY" ... ORDER... PRISONER BE RELEASED... "ON A DAY" AND "FOR A PERIOD" SPECIFIED "IN THE ORDER", BEING "NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS", AND WHAT IS 'TO CONSIDER' WITHIN OBLIGATION FIVE...

516.

"THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS" CSA. S. 67(7), WHY... BECAUSE 'THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS' (CSA. S. 67(7)), ARE 'DISCRETIONATE VARIABLE COMPONENTS'

517.

IN THAT THEY PERMIT TWO DISTINCT VARIABILITIES, ⁶FIRST, AT CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i) "A DAY ON WHICH PRISONER IS TO BE RELEASED", LINKING TO CSA. S. 67(6)(B) "MUST FORWARD ... TO THE GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL.", LINKING TO CSA. S. 67(7) "THE GOVERNOR "MAY" ([30.]) ... ORDER... ON A DAY" (THE "DAY" BEING WHAT WAS DECIDED AT CSA. S. 67(6)(A)(i), BUT DUE TO "MAY" AT

"THE GOVERNOR MAY" (CSA. s. 67(7)), MAY THEN INVOKE [30.], THEN DECLINE TO APPROVE THE 'DATE' DESIGNATED BY THE BOARD AT CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i), BUT BEFORE EXITING CONCLUSIVE OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(7), MUST ULTIMATELY AGREE WITH AND 'APPROVE' A SPECIFIC DATE OF RELEASE OF LIFER APPLICANT, WHICH BOTH BOARD AND GOVERNOR [29.] ARE SATISFIED WITH, AND SUCH DATE OF RELEASE IS ALSO INTRINSICALLY LINKED TO PERIOD/LENGTH OF PAROLE (CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii)), AS THE LENGTH OF PAROLE STARTS FROM THE DATE OF RELEASE (ON PAROLE), AND CONSEQUENTIALLY CONCLUDES NO MORE THAN 10 YEARS AFTER DATE OF RELEASE (CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii) "NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS OR MORE THAN TEN YEARS; FOR WHICH THE PRISONER SHOULD CONTINUE ON PAROLE;" , AND CSA. s. 67(7) "ORDER THAT THE PRISONER BE RELEASED FROM PRISON... AND FOR A PERIOD SPECIFIED... BEING NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS.")), AND SO BY GOVERNOR'S RIGHT NOT TO APPROVE THE SPECIFIC DATE DESIGNATED BY THE BOARD, ON WHICH TO RELEASE LIFER (FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS THE BOARD'S DESIGNATED DATE MIGHT NOT BE SUITABLE (CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i)), AND SO GOVERNOR DECLINES TO APPROVE SUCH DESIGNATED DATE (WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN A WEEKEND, PUBLIC HOLIDAY, ETC. AS THERE ARE MANY POSSIBLE REASONS TO VARY A SPECIFIED DATE OF RELEASE)), THROUGH INVOCATION OF "THE GOVERNOR "MAY" " [101. AND 30.], A NEW DATE OF RELEASE MUST BE DETERMINED BY BOARD (AT CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i)), WHICH FURTHER SUSTAINS ABOVE CLAIM BY ME (WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), THAT GOVERNOR MUST CONTINUE TO RETURN ITS DECLINATION OF BOARD'S SPECIFIED DATE OF RELEASE OF LIFER (CREATED WITHIN CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i)), TO THE BOARD, FOR BOARD TO DESIGNATE A DIFFERENT DATE OF RELEASE (WITHIN OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i)), TO THEN AGAIN COMPLY WITH CSA. s. 67(6)(B), AND SO ON UNTIL GOVERNOR CONCLUDES OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(7) WITH GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL OF BOTH CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i) AND CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii) , AND THE OTHER DISTINCT VARIABLE, SECOND, AT CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii) "A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS OR MORE THAN TEN YEARS, FOR WHICH THE PRISONER SHOULD CONTINUE ON PAROLE" , LINKING TO CSA. s. 67(6)(B) "MUST FORWARD... TO THE GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL."

518.

519.

520.

521.

LINKING TO CSA. s. 67(7) "THE GOVERNOR "MAY" ([30.])... ORDER... "AND" FOR A PERIOD... BEING NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS,"

NOTING ALSO THE INCLUSION OF "AND" (CSA. s. 67(7)), THEREBY INTRINSICALLY LINKING "A DAY ON WHICH" WITH "A PERIOD OF" (WITHIN CSA. s. 67(7)), AND COMPARATIVELY ALSO LINKED AT CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i) "A DAY ON WHICH" WITH CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii) "A PERIOD OF", THEREFORE, NOT ONLY ARE CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii) LINKED TO EACH OTHER WITHIN CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i) "AND", WHICH ARE THEN FORWARDED TO GOVERNOR "FOR APPROVAL" VIA CSA. s. 67(6)(B), THEIR LINKED RECEPTION IS CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE IN CSA. s. 67(7) "ON A DAY AND FOR A PERIOD" (AND HOW INTERESTING AND SIGNIFICANT IT IS THAT CSA. s. 67(7) HAS NO WORDED MENTION OF ANY ASPECT WHATSOEVER, OF ANY ACT OR PROCESS OR OUTCOME VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR [29.] ([64.]), OTHER THAN WHAT IS CLEARLY, POSITIVELY AND AFFIRMATIVELY DESCRIBED IN CLEAR WORDS, AND THEREFORE ALSO IDENTIFYING EXACTLY WHAT PARLIAMENT INTENDED BY OPERATION ~~OF~~ OF CSA. s. 67(7) (AFTER 1-8-1994 [46.]), WHICH WAS TO CONSIDER AND CONCLUDE EFFECT OF CSA. s. 67(7) WITH "APPROVAL" (CSA. s. 67(6)(B)), OF BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS, AS IDENTIFIED WITHIN CSA. ss. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii), SUSTAINING THEREFORE, THE VERY NARROW AND RESTRICTED SCOPE OF PERMITTED ACTION OF GOVERNOR [29.] WITH THE OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(7), AND, BY SUCH CLEAR WORDING THEREIN, AND IN COLLABORATION WITH CSA. s. 67(6), NO COMPETENCE IN ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] PERMITTED FORM, IS AVAILABLE OR PERMITTED TO GOVERNOR [29.], TO AFFECT (COMPETENT) BOARD'S FORMAL DECISION TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE', AND IN FACT TO DELVE DEEPER INTO SPECIFIC AUTHORITY, WOULD SHOW THAN ONCE BOARD DECIDES TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE OF LIFER', THE GOVERNOR DOESN'T REALLY OWN JURISDICTION TO PERFORM ANY JUDICIAL BODY REVIEW ~~ISO~~ [33.], OF THAT DECISION BY BOARD (FOR REASONS DESCRIBED ABOVE), ONLY TO RECEIVE, CONSIDER, THEN EVENTUALLY "APPROVE" DAY OF AND PERIOD OF PAROLE RELEASE), (THE "PERIOD" BEING WHAT WAS DECIDED AT CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii), BUT DUE TO "MAY" AT "THE GOVERNOR MAY" (CSA. s. 67(7)), MAY THEN INVOKE [30.], THEN DECLINE TO APPROVE THE 'PERIOD' DESIGNATED BY THE BOARD AT

CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii), BUT BEFORE EXITING CONCLUSIVE OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(7), MUST ULTIMATELY AGREE WITH AND 'APPROVE' A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF RELEASE OF LIFER APPLICANT, WHICH BOTH BOARD AND GOVERNOR [29.] ARE SATISFIED WITH, AND SUCH PERIOD OF RELEASE IS ALSO INTRINSICALLY LINKED TO DATE OF RELEASE (CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i)), AS THE LENGTH OF PAROLE STARTS FROM THE DATE OF RELEASE (ON PAROLE), AND CONSEQUENTIALLY CONCLUDES NO MORE THAN 10 YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF RELEASE (CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii)) "NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS OR MORE THAN TEN YEARS, FOR WHICH THE PRISONER SHOULD CONTINUE ON PAROLE;" AND CSA. s. 67(7) "ORDER THAT THE PRISONER BE RELEASED FROM PRISON... AND FOR A PERIOD SPECIFIED... BEING NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS.")), AND SO BY GOVERNOR'S RIGHT NOT TO APPROVE THE SPECIFIC PERIOD DESIGNATED BY THE BOARD, ON WHICH THE PRISONER (LIFER APPLICANT), SHOULD REMAIN ON PAROLE (FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS THE BOARD'S DESIGNATED PERIOD MIGHT NOT BE SUITABLE (CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND SO GOVERNOR DECLINES TO APPROVE SUCH DESIGNATED PERIOD/LENGTH), THROUGH INVOCATION OF "THE GOVERNOR "MAY"" [101. AND 30.], A NEW PERIOD/LENGTH OF RELEASE MUST BE DETERMINED BY BOARD (AT CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii)), WHICH FURTHER SUSTAINS ABOVE CLAIM BY ME (WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), THAT GOVERNOR MUST CONTINUE TO RETURN ITS DECLINATION OF BOARD'S SPECIFIED PERIOD OF RELEASE (ON PAROLE), OF LIFER (CREATED WITHIN CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii)), TO THE BOARD, FOR THE BOARD TO DESIGNATE A DIFFERENT PERIOD OF RELEASE ON PAROLE (WITHIN OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii)), TO THEN AGAIN COMPLY WITH CSA. s. 67(6)(B), AND SO ON UNTIL GOVERNOR CONCLUDES OPERATION OF CSA. s. 67(7) WITH GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL OF BOTH CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(i) AND CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii) (FURTHER NOTING, THAT DUE TO THE PREREQUISITE OBSERVANCE WITHIN CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii) AND CSA. s. 67(7), OF A MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM PERIOD OF PAROLE LENGTH, FROM WHICH THE BOARD MAY DISCRETIONATELY [SEE PARAGRAPH 401. IBID], CHOOSE (PURSUANT TO CSA. s. 67(6)(A)(ii)), AND WHICH THE GOVERNOR MAY DISCRETIONATELY [30. AND 101.] DECLINE TO ACCEPT/APPROVE (MINIMUM PAROLE LENGTH IS THREE YEARS (APPROX. 1095 DAYS), MAXIMUM IS TEN YEARS (APPROX. 3650 DAYS)), THE GOVERNOR MAY IN FACT DECLINE ([101. AND 30.]), WITHIN OPERATION OF [101.],

THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION CSA.s. 67(6)(Xii), A MAXIMUM OF APPROXIMATELY 2554 TIMES (3650 DAYS MINUS 1095 DAYS, BUT LEAVING ONE DATE AS THE DATE ON WHICH PAROLE LENGTH SHOULD CONCLUDE), THOUGH EACH DECLINATION OF APPROVAL OF BOARD'S DESIGNATED PAROLE LENGTH (CSA.s. 67(6)(Xii), CSA.s. 67(7), [30.]), BY THE GOVERNOR, PURSUANT TO [101. AND 30.], SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY WRITTEN REASON (FORWARDED TO BOARD [202.]), TO JUSTIFY SUCH DECLINATION (TO SHOW LEGAL CAUSE), AND IF GOVERNOR [29.] REFUSES TO PRESENT 'CAUSE OF DECLINATION' TO THE BOARD, THEN GOVERNOR'S (VERY LIMITED AND RESTRICTED SCOPE OF JURISDICTION WITHIN [101.], SHOULD BE VOIDED DUE TO 'IMPROPER CONDUCT BY GOVERNOR'), PARTICIPATION VIA [101.] SHOULD BE ABSORBED BY THE BOARD, THEREBY ENSURING THAT BOARD'S FORMAL DETERMINATION WITHIN [100.], TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE RELEASE' (CSA.s. 67(6) "AND, IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS"), WHICH THEN, ONCE THAT ABSOLUTE DETERMINATION IS DELIVERED, MUST THEN AWAIT "APPROVAL" (CSA.s. 67(6)(B)), FROM GOVERNOR OF THE TWO DISCRETIONATE ([30.]) VARIABLES WHICH GOVERNOR [29.] IS COMPETENTLY AUTHORISED TO 'RECEIVE', TO 'CONSIDER' AND THEN 'MAKE DECISION ABOUT' (BEING CSA.s. 67(6)(A)(i) AND 67(6)(A)(ii)), PURSUANT TO CSA.s. 67(6)(A)(i), 67(6)(A)(ii), 67(6)(B) AND 67(7), CONTINUES TO ACTUAL PAROLE RELEASE OF LIFER APPLICANT (AND IS NOT IMPROPERLY AND/OR UNPROFESSIONALLY STALLED BY GOVERNOR [29.])). FOR GOVERNOR [29.] TO OPERATE, FOLLOWING CSA.s. 67(6), 67(6)(A), 67(6)(A)(i), 67(6)(A)(ii), 67(6)(B), WITHIN THE PERMITTED ARENA AND SCOPE OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF CSA.s. 67(7), IN ANY WAY WHICH INTERFERES WITH LIFER APPLICANT'S 'APPLICATION FOR PAROLE' RELEASE, SO AS TO CAUSE 'REJECTION OUTRIGHT' (BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT), OF SAID 'APPLICATION FOR PAROLE', IS ILLEGAL (AS STATUTE, PRIOR TO 2012, AND AFTER 1-8-1994 [46.], DID NOT PERMIT SUCH AN ACT), AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL (FOR SIMILAR REASONS, AND THE INCLUSION OF [102.] (UNLAWFULLY ASSENTED [28.]), UP TO 1-1-2016, STILL DID NOT PERMIT OR ENABLE SUCH AN ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]) ACT).

525. " PARA. 25: ... 'NOR DOES IT REQUIRE REASONS FROM THE BOARD, BECAUSE IN SUCH A CASE THE BOARD HAS NOT REFUSED AN APPLICATION FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE.' "

527. 1. THE KEY ELEMENT IS THE REASONING, AND IT IS FALSE.

2. THE BOARD IS THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY (E.I.) COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH DECISION, "AND, IF THE BOARD SO RECOMMENDS" (CSA. s. 67(6) [100.]), AND IF CSA. s. 67(7) IS ENGAGED, THEN IN FACT, THE BOARD DID MAKE SUCH A DECISION WHICH STATE GOVERNMENT (UNDER CH. II [3.]), MUST THEN ENFORCE, AND WHICH GOVERNOR [29.] HAS NO JURISDICTION TO VOID ([SEE PARAS. 485. TO 525. IBID, FOR DETAILED EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT MY ARGUMENT]). IT IS CORRECT THAT THE BOARD DID NOT MAKE THE 'REJECTION OF LIFER APPLICANTS' PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATION', BECAUSE IF THE BOARD HAD, THEN AT THE POSITION OF CSA. s. 67(6) "THE BOARD "MAY"", INVOKE [30.], BOARD MOVE NO FURTHER WITHIN CSA. s. 67(6), INSTEAD MOVES DIRECTLY TO CSA. s. 67(9) ([100., 107., 108. AND 109.]). IN FACT, THE GOVERNOR, WHO HAD NO LEGAL COMPETENCE, JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OR CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] COMPETENCE, THEREFORE HAVING NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO DO SO, ILLEGALLY INTERFERED WITH DUE PROCESS OF LIFER APPLICANTS' PAROLE APPLICATION, AND THE BOARD ALSO, AND UNLAWFULLY, ALLOWED GOVERNOR TO DO SO ([65., 82. AND 83.]). ALSO, IT IS THE BOARD WHO FORWARDS WRITTEN NOTIFICATION TO LIFER, INFORMING OF 'REJECTED PAROLE APPLICATION', AND SO IS THEREFORE AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT AND ACCESSORY TO THE ILLEGAL ACT BY GOVERNOR [29.], TO EFFECT REJECTION BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LIFER'S APPLICATION FOR PAROLE. IF NOT FOR THE SERIOUS ERRORS OF AND BY THIS COURT, WHO ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY ALL RELEVANT STATUTES TO THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON [45.] AND (OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF) [126.], AND ALL RELEVANT CASE LAW RELEVANT TO THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON (PARTICULARLY JUDGMENTS AFTER WATSON'S SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED BY THE COMPETENCE SENTENCING COURT), ESPECIALLY [131., 195., 196., 197., 72., 73., 77., 78., 80. AND 135.] (THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECT), AND THE TRUE AND ACCURATE INTENTIONS OF PARLIAMENT, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE PARLIAMENT, IN VERY SPECIFIC, CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS WORDING ([64.]), IN THE CSA, COMPETENTLY DESCRIBED AND DEFINED THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD, AND THE GOVERNOR [29.], WITH REGARD SPECIFICALLY TO [94., 100., 101., 106., 107., 108., 109., 110., 111., 112., 113., 202. AND 203.],

532. THEN, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT COULD NOT BE IN FAVOUR OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT, IT COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN IN FAVOUR OF WATSON. EVEN THOUGH THE ARGUMENTS BY MR MEAD WERE INEPT, AND AT TIMES ERRONEOUS IN THEIR PRESENTATION AND SUGGESTIONS, ^{THERE} ~~THEIR~~ WAS SUFFICIENT CHARACTER AND OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED TO THE COURT, IN WATSON'S COMPLAINT, TO PERMIT AND TO ENABLE THE COURT TO FUNDAMENTALLY AND ACCURATELY ADDRESS THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL, AND IN FACT FAILURE, TO NOT ONLY LAWFULLY ENFORCE THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON WATSON BY THE COMPETENT CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, BUT ALSO TO RELEASE WATSON ON PAROLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS ACCRUED AND ABSOLUTE RIGHTS, WHICH WERE OWED TO HIM BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT [126.], PURSUANT TO THE IMPOSED SENTENCE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S DECLINATION TO EFFECT/INVOKE SPECIFIC MECHANISMS TO TRY AND EXTEND WATSON'S INCARCERATION LAWFULLY [194. (PARA. 68.)], ALTHOUGH SUCH INVOCATION WOULD HAVE FAILED AS SOON AS THE COURT (HEARING SUCH AN APPLICATION BY THE STATE), NOTED THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION [100.] TO
533. RELEASE WATSON ON PAROLE. THE STATE GOVERNMENT INSTEAD CHOSE TO UNLAWFULLY EXTEND WATSON'S INCARCERATION, AND, ILLEGALLY RE-SENTENCE WATSON EVERY TIME THE GOVERNOR [29.] EFFECTED THE STATE'S REFUSAL TO
534. RELEASE WATSON. ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT POINT, IS THAT THIS COURT, DUE TO ITS ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT, AND ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF O'SHEA ([205.]) AS (THE COURT'S) VALIDATION FOR ITS JUDGMENT, HAS BECOME A DEFACTO ACCESSORY TO THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY (AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), ALSO DUE TO NOW ADDITIONALLY BEING A 'POLITICAL PRISONER' AS THE GOVERNOR [29.] IS THE ENTITY WHICH EFFECTED REJECTION OF WATSON'S PAROLE APPLICATION), RESENTENCING AND ILLEGALLY INCARCERATING WATSON 'WITHIN A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY' SINCE APPROXIMATELY 2002 ([194. (PARA. 31.)]), FOR REASONS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT.
535. " PARA. 50: ... AND THAT ANY REQUIREMENT TO ACT FAIRLY BY ALLOWING AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS RELATING TO MR WATSON'S RELEASE WAS MET THROUGH THE ABILITY TO DO SO TO THE BOARD. ... THAT, BRIEFLY, IS THE EFFECT OF THE HIGH COURT DECISION IN O'SHEA. "